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Abstract
We study the interplay between competition and trust as e¢ ciency-
enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money. With com-
mitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures ef-
￿ciency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does
play a role but requires a bound on e¢ ciency. Stationary in￿ ation
must be non-negative and, therefore, the Friedman rule cannot be
achieved.
The quality of money can only be observed after its purchasing
capacity is realized. In that sense money is an experience good.
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1There could be no more e⁄ective check against the abuse of money
by the government than if people were free to refuse any money they
distrusted and to prefer money in which they had con￿dence. (...)
Therefore, let us deprive governments (or their monetary authorities)
of all the power to protect their money against competition: if they
can no longer conceal that their money is becoming bad, they will have
to restrict the issue. (F.A. Hayek, 1974 Choice in Currency: A Way
to Stop In￿ation p.18. The Institute of Economic A⁄airs, London.)
1 Introduction
Can currency be e¢ ciently provided by competitive markets? A traditional
laissez-faire view ￿as, for example, has been expressed by Hayek ￿based on
￿ Bertrand competition￿argues that competition drives the price of money to
its marginal cost. Therefore, if the marginal cost of producing currency is
zero, competition drives nominal interest rates to zero and private provision
of currency is e¢ cient.
We show that there is a major ￿ aw in this ￿ Bertrand competition￿argu-
ment, when applied to ￿at money: if suppliers of currency cannot commit
to their future actions, then competition loses its bite. The reason for this is
that, while currencies compete on their promised rates of return, once agents
hold a particular currency there may be an incentive for the issuer to in-
￿ ate the price of goods in terms of this currency, reducing, in this way, its
outstanding liabilities. Current currency portfolios have been pre-speci￿ed,
while there is full ￿ exibility to choose tomorrow￿ s portfolios. Currencies com-
pete for tomorrow￿ s portfolios. When choices are sequential, currencies are
no longer perfect substitutes; in a sense, they are not substitutes at all. Does
￿Bertrand competition￿still drive promised rates of return to the e¢ cient
level? Not if those promises are not credible, if issuers of currencies are not
trusted.
Trust may solve the time inconsistency problem in the supply of money,
since concern for the future circulation of money may deter currency issuers
from creating in￿ ation. Nevertheless, reputation concerns exist as long as
currency suppliers expect su¢ ciently high future pro￿ts to refrain from cap-
turing the short-term gains. Does competition, by driving down pro￿ts,
enhance e¢ ciency but also destroy the disciplinary properties of the ￿ trust
2mechanism￿? We show that there is no such trade-o⁄. Without commitment,
competition plays no role in sustaining e¢ cient outcomes.
We analyze a model of currency competition where goods are supplied in
perfectly competitive markets, and consumers can buy these goods by using
any of a continuum of di⁄erentiated currencies. Each currency is supplied
by a pro￿t maximizing ￿rm. Even though the currencies are imperfect sub-
stitutes, by making the degree of substitutability arbitrarily large we can
characterize the limiting economy of perfect substitution among currencies.
With commitment, currency competition achieves the e¢ cient (Friedman
rule) monetary equilibrium, as Hayek envisioned. It does this in a remark-
able way: because the cost of providing money is very low, even a very large
mark up is associated with a very low price charged for the use of money. In
the limit, as the cost of producing money converges to zero, the equilibrium
is e¢ cient whatever the elasticity of substitution across competing currencies
is.
The Friedman rule condition of zero nominal interest rates implies that
in￿ ation will be negative on average, since real interest rates are on average
positive. Currency issuers will have to withdraw money from circulation,
which means that cash ￿ ows will be negative. Even if the total revenues
from currency issuance, including the gains from the initial issuance, may be
positive, in each period losses will be incurred. In order for this to be an
equilibrium, currency issuers must be able to commit to future losses.
Without commitment, negative in￿ ation cannot be sustained. But, as it
turns out, every stationary positive in￿ ation is an equilibrium outcome, and
the degree of substitutability does not a⁄ect this characterization. These
are the main results of this paper: i) the existence of a bound on e¢ ciency
de￿ned by the need to ￿ sustain trust￿ ; ii) that the bound of e¢ ciency corre-
sponds to in￿ ation being non-negative and iii) there exists an indeterminacy
of equilibria with positive in￿ ation rates and competition playing no role.
These results apply to other markets where goods or services must be
purchased before their quality can be observed. Those goods are called ex-
perience goods.1 There is a sense in which money is also an experience good.
We can think of the quality of money as the amount of goods that money
can buy, the real value of money, which can only be observed ex-post. The
provision of money and the provision of experience goods seem a priori very
di⁄erent problems (the former being a commitment problem and the latter
1See Nelson (1970).
3an information problem), but they are indeed isomorphic regarding the in-
terplay between competition and trust. While the elasticity of substitution
for high quality goods can be quite high, once the goods have been purchased
the elasticity is zero. A supplier who does not take into account reputational
concerns will only consider this elasticity, and will not supply high quality
goods or services. Still, in a dynamic economy, ￿rms are concerned about
their future market position, so that the need to maintain ￿ trust￿in their
products may be enough to discipline them to e⁄ectively provide high qual-
ity goods. The mechanism that can sustain high quality (and possibly low
prices) is ￿ trust,￿not ￿ competition.￿This analogy is discussed in section 6.
The issue of currency competition has been the subject of an extensive
academic debate. This debate has seen many supporters of free competition
making an exception when it comes to money (Friedman, 1960), while ad-
vocates of free currency competition (notably, Hayek (1974 and 1978), and
Rocko⁄, 1975) have been somewhat isolated. In spite of this, the relatively
recent reappraisal of the self-regulating properties of free banking2 has raised
new interest in the study of currency competition.
The problem of time-inconsistency of monetary policies has been exten-
sively studied since Calvo (1978),3 but with the partial exceptions of Klein
(1974) and Taub (1985), the currency competition argument has not been
considered. Klein understood that the problem of currency competition could
not be studied independently of the time inconsistency problem. Like Shapiro
(1983), he postulated ad-hoc beliefs, so the way competition and reputation
interplay in determining equilibrium outcomes is not analyzed. He raised
some of the questions we address in this paper but without a full charac-
terization as we do here. Similarly, Taub (1985) studies the interaction of
commitment and competition using a di⁄erent approach and obtaining dif-
ferent results; we discuss this in Section 5.
Marimon, Nicolini and Teles (2003) analyze the e⁄ects of electronic money,
and other currency substitutes, on monetary policy, focusing on the case in
which the central bank cannot commit to future policy. The suppliers of
inside money must use an ine¢ cient technology, relative to the provision of
2See, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1996), Dowd (1992), King (1983), Rolnick and
Weber (1983), Selgin (1987), Selgin & White (1987), Vaubel (1985), and, more generally,
White (1989, 1993) . See also Schuler (1992), for an account of historical episodes of free
banking, and Hayek (1974,1978), Dowd (1992) and White (1993).
3See, for example, Kehoe (1989), Chang (1998), Chari and Kehoe (1990), Ireland (1997)
and Stokey (1991).
4outside money. The main di⁄erence to the problem we study here is that the
suppliers of inside money - banks - are assumed to behave competitively and
to issue deposits in the same units of account as the outside money issued
by the central bank. Thus, the banks are small and take prices as given
and, as such, cannot manipulate the price level. It follows that they are not
subject to the time inconsistency problem that the supplier of outside money
faces. Competition from inside money does play a role in this context. Im-
provements in the technology to supply inside money do bring equilibrium
in￿ ation down. In this paper we are interested in analyzing competition in
the provision of di⁄erent currencies, and therefore the time inconsistency
problem is shared by all the suppliers. The strategic interaction between
money issuers and, more importantly, between each issuer and consumers is
the main theme of this paper.4
An interesting application of the analysis in this paper is to competition
in the supply of reserve currencies. For the issuer of a reserve currency
with commitment there is a level of in￿ ation that maximizes seigniorage
revenues from nonresidents. The benevolent Ramsey planner will have to
weigh those gains against the costs of distortionary in￿ ation a⁄ecting resident
agents. The resulting in￿ ation rate could be reasonably high. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2011) compute the optimal in￿ ation rate for the US dollar and
conclude that this could be the justi￿cation for the observed deviation from
the Friedman rule. Taking our approach, we would add that competition with
alternative providers of a reserve currency, such as the Euro, would imply
di⁄erent equilibrium outcomes. Under commitment, Bertrand competition
would bring in￿ ation back down to the Friedman rule. Without commitment,
any positive in￿ ation would be sustainable, as long as seigniorage revenues
from non residents were the only objective of reserve currency issuers.
2 A model of currency competition
We consider an economy with a large number of identical households that
draw utility from a single consumption good, ct, and disutility from work
4Taub (1986) considers the problem of a monopolist that issues currency and can
commit for a given number of periods. By varying the elasticity of money demand faced
by the monopolist, Taub studies the interaction between the length of the commitment
period and the implicit degree of competition.




t [U(ct) ￿ ￿nt], (1)
where U is increasing and concave and, without loss of generality, U(0) = 0.
￿ is a positive constant. The technology is linear in labour, with a unitary
coe¢ cient, so
ct = nt: (2)
The consumption good is produced by perfectly competitive ￿rms. Therefore
the price of consumption in terms of labour will be one.
We assume that consumers must buy the consumption good with a com-
posite of the continuum of all possible di⁄erentiated currencies. This com-








, ￿ > 1; (3)
where m(i)t is the real value of type i money, used for transactions at time
t. The currencies are imperfect substitutes but we consider imperfect sub-
stitutability only as a methodological device to study the limiting economy
where substitutability is arbitrarily large. In the limit, each of the currencies
has general purchasing power. This model is a natural framework for analyz-
ing Hayek￿ s conjecture that money can be supplied e¢ ciently by the market,
and, as such, it contains interesting implications for monetary theory.





q(i)tM(i)t+1di+ct ￿ nt +bt(1+rt)+
Z 1
0
q(i)tM(i)tdi+￿t; t ￿ 0;
where q(i)t is the price of currency i in units of the consumption good and
M(i)t is the quantity of money i, held from time t ￿ 1 to time t, and used
for transactions at time t, so that m(i)t = q(i)tM(i)t. ￿(i)t are the current
pro￿ts of the provider of currency i in units of the consumption good, ￿t = R 1
0 ￿(i)tdi. In every period t; the consumer purchases M(i)t+1 of currency i
and real bonds bt+1 that pay the real interest rate rt+1 in period t+1. M(i)0




m(i)t+1 (1 + ￿(i)t+1)di+ct ￿ nt+bt(1+rt)+
Z 1
0





The cash-in-advance constraint is








for all t; which is binding, for t ￿ 1, when gross nominal interest rates are
greater than one.
Let R(i)t+1 be the gross nominal interest rate from time t to t + 1 on
currency i, so that R(i)t+1 ￿ (1 + rt+1)(1 + ￿(i)t+1), and let








Then, the ￿rst order conditions of the consumer￿ s problem imply:
U











￿ 1 ￿ ￿; t ￿ 0:
We now describe the problem of a currency issuer. The ￿ ow of funds
condition for the issuer of currency i is given by
q(i)tM(i)t+1 + d(i)t+1 = q(i)tM(i)t + d(i)t(1 + ￿) + ￿(i)t;
where d(i)t+1 is the debt issued by the issuer of currency i at time t, in units
of the consumption good, ￿(i)t are the pro￿ts of the currency issuer in units
of the consumption good, and M(i)0 and d(i)0 are both given. The issuer also
faces a no-Ponzi game condition guaranteeing that the present value budget












73 Equilibria with commitment
As in standard (single currency) monetary models, a monetary policy for the
i-currency issuer consists of an initial currency price and a sequence of future
nominal interest rates, (q(i)0;fR(i)tg
1
t=1).
In order to maximize the present value of pro￿ts (7), ￿rms must choose
R(i)t to maximize
[R(i)t ￿ 1]m(i)t;
taking the demand for currency (6) as given. Optimality also requires that
the real value of initial outstanding money holdings (liabilities for the issuer)
become zero, q(i)0M(i)0 = 0. As long as M(i)0 > 0, this implies that
q(i)0 = 0, or that the initial price level is arbitrarily high.5
The maximization of [R(i)t ￿ 1]m(i)t subject to (6), results in
R(i)t = 1;




This equilibrium is e¢ cient, since the allocations that maximize utility




This equilibrium is e¢ cient independently of the elasticity of substitution
across the competing currencies because money is costless to produce. If there




q(i)tM(i)t+1 + d(i)t+1 = q(i)tM(i)t + d(i)t(1 + ￿) + ￿(i)t;
then the present value of pro￿ts would be
5This means that the price level would be in￿nite. We also allow for in￿nite growth
rates of the prices. This is in line with the literature on optimal monetary policy, with


















Firms would then choose R(i)t, t ￿ 1, to maximize
[R(i)t ￿ 1 ￿ ￿]m(i)t
and the choice for the nominal interest rate would be
R(i)t ￿ 1 = ￿￿:
The nominal interest rate, R(i)t ￿1, would be equal to the mark up ￿ times
the marginal cost ￿. The mark up ￿ is determined by the substitutability
of the currencies. The closer ￿ is to one, the higher is the degree of substi-
tutability. As currency substitution increases, i.e., ￿ & 1; nominal interest
rates tend to ￿, i.e. R(i)t￿1 & ￿, covering the production cost of real money.
As the cost of providing money is made arbitrarily close to zero, ￿ & 0,
the price charged for it, being a constant markup over marginal cost, is also
close to zero. This is the case, regardless of the elasticity of substitution that
determines the mark up. The nominal interest rate tends to zero, R(i)t￿1 &
0, i.e. the Friedman rule is implemented.
With full commitment, Hayek￿ s conjecture, that e¢ cient monetary equi-
libria can be achieved through currency competition, is veri￿ed. But, as it
turns out, the conjecture proves to be right in a particularly powerful way.
The production cost of money is low; so low that it is usually assumed to be
zero. The equilibrium is e¢ cient because money is costless to produce even
if there may be low elasticity of substitution across competing currencies.
The ￿ abuse of money by the government￿ Naturally, if there were
a single supplier of a single money stock Mt in this economy the equilibrium
would not be e¢ cient. There would be monopoly pro￿ts, regardless of the
cost of producing money.












which are the same as (7) without the i indexation. The monopolist takes
into account that
9U
0(ct+1) = ￿Rt+1; t ￿ 0;
and the cash-in-advance constraint,
ct+1 ￿ mt+1; t ￿ 0,


















The optimal solution will be to set q0M0 = 0, and choose a constant








￿ 1 ￿ 0:
This inequality is required because there could be a corner solution where
m = 0.
In particular, for the case of isoelastic utility, U(c) = c1￿￿￿1




(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1
so that if ￿ ￿ 1, the derivative is always negative and the optimal m is the
lowest, corresponding to an arbitrarily large R. If 0 < ￿ < 1, there is an







so that there is a distortion even with ￿ = 0, which is larger the lower the
price elasticity 1
￿ is.
Time consistency and intertemporal seigniorage accounting As
in standard single currency monetary models, the full commitment policy is
time inconsistent. This can easily be seen by considering how the present












10Thus, if given the option of changing plan at time t, which we rule out
when assuming full commitment, the currency issuer will ￿nd it optimal to
let q(i)tM(i)t be zero. The reason is that, while the real money demand is
decreasing in the nominal interest rate ￿i.e. in the expected future price level
￿once consumers have made their currency decisions, the nominal money
demand is predetermined and therefore it is rigid with respect to the current
price level.
The real value of the outstanding money balances q(i)tM(i)t is set to
zero through an initial big open market operation in which currency M(i)t+1
is issued in an arbitrarily large amount and lent to the consumers. Each
currency issuer takes a negative position in bond holdings in an amount
equal to the real quantity of money. In this way the currency issuer is able
to eliminate its outstanding liabilities and reissue the money stock.
What is then the seigniorage revenue when the value of outstanding cur-
rency is set to zero? For a constant nominal interest rate R(i)j = R(i),




In every period, the issuer of currency receives the nominal interest rate
times the real quantity of money. Suppose now that the value of outstanding
currency is not set to zero, but that it is equal to the stationary level of real
balances m(i). Then, again for a constant nominal interest rate R(i)j =
R(i), j ￿ t + 1, seigniorage revenue is
￿
1 ￿ ￿




In this case seigniorage revenue is zero when stationary in￿ ation is zero; in
the case above, if in￿ ation is zero, seigniorage revenue is positive and equal









that is, the money stock itself. The full commitment equilibrium is time
inconsistent because each currency issuer would want to reissue every period.
In an equilibrium with stationary positive in￿ ation, seigniorage revenues
are positive as of period zero, when the currency issuer takes into account
11the gains from the initial issuance, but they are also positive in all the future
periods. Instead, when in￿ ation is negative, the gains are still positive as
of period zero, because the nominal interest rate is positive, but they are
negative from there on.
The e¢ cient equilibrium with full commitment is supported with negative
in￿ ation; i.e. ￿(i)t & (￿ ￿ 1). Stationary pro￿ts are therefore negative. This
seigniorage accounting is at the core of the intertemporal incentives faced by
a currency issuer deciding sequentially. We turn now to the analysis of the
case without commitment.
4 Currency competition without commitment
With full commitment, there is no distinction between ex-ante and ex-post
nominal interest rates. We were able to specify the decisions of the cur-
rency issuer in terms of the whole sequence of ex-ante nominal interest rates,
fR(i)tg
1
t=1, which depend on the realization of future prices. Without com-
mitment, that cannot be done. We have to de￿ne the strategies of the cur-
rency issuer in terms of realized, ex-post nominal interest rates. We de￿ne
these as Rq(i)t = (1 + ￿)(1 +
q(i)t￿1
q(i)t ).
Firms maximize short-run pro￿ts by setting an arbitrarily large price,
P(i)t, corresponding to q(i)t = 0, and to an arbitrarily large, ex-post nominal
interest rate, 1
Rq(i)t = 0. This means that outstanding money holdings will
be in￿ ated away (making ￿ the quality of outstanding money￿arbitrarily low).
Consumers purchase currencies before they observe the real return they yield,
and must form their expectations of future prices, based on past information
and current prices. Reputation is the only thing that can prevent ￿rms from
￿ ￿ ying-by-night.￿
Currency issuers choose Rq(i)t = (1 + ￿)(1 +
q(i)t￿1
q(i)t ), except for the ￿rst
period where q(i)0 is chosen, since q(i)￿1 is not de￿ned6. Histories are given





, for t ￿ 1:
The i-currency issuer strategy is given by
￿
b
i;0(h￿1) = q(i)0; and
￿
b
i;t(ht￿1) = ￿i;t; for t ￿ 1;
6Note that given a history, choosing the price of the currency at time t; is equivalent
to choosing the ex-post nominal interest rate.
12where ￿i;t is a density function on R+, such that ￿i;t(ht￿1; 1
Rq(i)t) is the density
of 1
Rq(i)t; conditional on ht￿1:7
Consumers behave competitively, deciding according to the allocation




t(ht) = fct;nt; bt+1;M(i)t+1;all ig , for t ￿ 0;
based on ￿i
t ￿their beliefs about future decisions of the currency issuers ￿and
the corresponding prices; where ￿i
t(ht; 1
Rq(i)t+1) denotes the assessed density
of the ex-post interest rate 1
Rq(i)t+1: Rational expectations require that beliefs

















1. for every (t;ht); ￿b
i;t(ht￿1) solves the maximization problem of the i-
currency issuer;
2. ￿c
t(ht) solves the consumer￿ s problem given consistent beliefs ￿i
t(ht; 1
Rq(i)t+1);
3. all markets clear.
A Sustainable Currency Competitive Equilibrium provides a natural frame-
work within which to study the interactions between competition and trust.
On the one hand, as long as ￿ is strictly larger than one, the economy exhibits
monopolistic power, and as ￿ gets close to one, the competition between is-
suers is increased. On the other hand, the beliefs of the consumers depend
on the ￿rms￿actions. In this sense, the ￿rms care about their reputation.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in the
sense that all ￿rms behave the same way in equilibrium.
Let us consider an equilibrium where strategies do not depend on histo-
ries. If the current actions of the issuers of currency do not a⁄ect consumers￿
expectations about their future actions, then it is a dominant strategy for
the issuer of each currency to choose 1
Rq(i)t = 0, for every t ￿ 1. At t = 0,
q(i)0 = 0. It follows that the currency will not be held, m(i)t+1 = 0, t ￿ 0.
7Since issuers decide on q(i)0 before consumers make any decision, there is no need to
introduce mixed strategies into that decision.
8Note that at time t consumers care about future monetary policy. That is why time
t beliefs ought to be the same as ￿rms￿strategies at t + 1:
13The resulting payo⁄ for the issuer, as of any period t ￿ 0, is ￿
d(i)t
￿ . The is-
suers can guarantee themselves this payo⁄independently of consumer beliefs.















where the demand for currency i, m(i j vi
j￿1)j, depends on the beliefs vi
j￿1.
Given that m(i j vi
j￿1)j ￿ 0, the minimum value of pro￿ts, is ￿
d(i)t
￿ . This is
the case when q(i)j = 0, 1
Rq(i)j+1 = 0, and m(i j vi
j￿1)j = 0, for all j ￿ t. This
equilibrium is, therefore, the worst SCCE. More formally,
Proposition 1 There exist a low quality SCCE, supported by strategies
q(i)0 = 0, and ￿i;t(ht￿1;0) = 1, and beliefs ￿i
t(ht;0) = 1, with correspond-
ing allocations. Furthermore, there is no SCCE with lower payo⁄s for the
currency issuers.
Incidentally, note that this is the unique SCCE (payo⁄) in which strate-
gies do not depend on histories. In this case no issuer is ever trusted to
provide high-quality money. This would be the unique outcome if issuers
were anonymous players, not accountable for their past decisions.
We now check whether a stationary gross nominal interest rate, R = R(i),
is sustainable as a SCCE. In order to check this, we consider the standard
trigger strategies of reverting to the worst SCCE strategies, which in our
context should be understood as a generalized loss of con￿dence in a currency
when there is a deviation from an equilibrium path. Suppose that the i-
currency issuer considers a deviation in period t > 0; letting 1
Rq(i)t ! 0,
by printing an arbitrarily large quantity of money. Suppose that agents￿
expectations are such that, after observing that the ex-post rate di⁄ers from
the equilibrium outcome R, they become ￿i
t+s(ht+s; 1
Rq(i)t+1+s = 0) = 1, for
any ht+s; s ￿ 0. Given such beliefs, real money demand for that currency
is zero from time t on, i.e., m(i)t+s = 0, s ￿ 0, which means that the newly
issued pieces of paper are worthless.
The value of the outcome after the deviation is zero, except for the value
of the outstanding real debt. The reason is that the deviation triggers a
currency collapse for that currency, starting tomorrow. The demand for
money, being an asset, depends on future prices. Thus, the expectations of
14the currency collapse make the newly injected money be worthless today.
Therefore, the present value of the bene￿ts following a deviation is obtained





















The last equality follows fromthe fact that, in equilibrium, m(i) = q(i)tM(i)t:
It follows that the i-currency issuer will choose not to deviate when
￿
￿1 [R(i) ￿ 1] ￿ 1 ￿ 0;
i.e. R(i) ￿ 1 + ￿:
Since R(i) = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿(i)), the condition is satis￿ed, whenever
￿(i) ￿ 0:
An equilibrium path with symmetric stationary policies is sustainable if
and only if the corresponding in￿ ation rates are non-negative. The reason
why in￿ ation must be non-negative is because of the timing of collection of
revenues for the issuers.
A positive nominal interest rate guarantees that the seigniorage revenue
is positive as of time 0, when the real value of the initial outstanding money
stock is zero. The nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate,
which is the period-by-period return on the initial issuance of money, plus
the in￿ ation rate. The issuers of currency lend the initial money balances to
the households. Thus, they hold positive assets in an amount equal to the
real value of those balances. From those assets they collect the real rate of
interest, ￿. As of any period t ￿ 1, the gains from the initial issuance of
money are sunk. All that matters for the currency issuers is the additional
revenue given by the depletion each period of the real quantity of money.
15In￿ ation must therefore be positive and the nominal interest rate, higher than
the real, to guarantee positive pro￿ts in each period t; therefore, in￿ ation
must be at least non-negative. More formally,
Proposition 2 ￿(i) = ￿ is an outcome of a stationary symmetric SCCE if
and only if ￿ ￿ 0.
Proposition 2 has two implications. The ￿rst is that sustainable equilib-
ria are ine¢ cient. While with commitment it is necessary that the present
value of pro￿ts at date zero is positive, without commitment pro￿ts must
be non-negative in any period, and that implies that there must be strictly
positive pro￿ts in period zero. The second implication is that competition
plays no role in the absence of commitment, regardless of whether there are
competing currencies or a single supplier of a single currency.9 The set of
sustainable equilibria is characterized by ￿ ￿ 0, independently of the elas-
ticity of substitution. Notice that the set of equilibria would be the same if
there were a single currency and a single supplier of it.
In summary, without full commitment, Hayek￿ s conjecture that e¢ cient
monetary equilibria can be achieved through currency competition is not ver-
i￿ed, as long as optimality requires de￿ ation in equilibrium, as in Friedman￿ s
rule ￿of a zero nominal interest rate associated with de￿ ation when ￿ > 0.
The discount rate ￿ does not a⁄ect the condition on in￿ ation for sustain-
ability. However it does a⁄ect the e¢ ciency of the lowest in￿ ation equilib-
rium. The lower ￿ is, the closer is zero in￿ ation to the e¢ cient outcome.
Now, does this mean that if the length of the time period were shortened, it
would be possible to sustain more e¢ cient outcomes? No, that should not be
the case. In a monetary model, the currency issuer compares the gains from
depleting the outstanding stock of money with the future ￿ ows from money
issuance. The gains from the depletion of the initial stock should not be af-
fected by the length of the time period, and neither should, the present value
of future gains. The model does not distinguish between a direct change in ￿
and a change in the length of the time period. In order to be able to estab-
lish that distinction, velocity needs to be variable. We have considered that
velocity is one. By doing this we have pinned down the length of the time pe-
riod. Because velocity relates the stock of money to the ￿ ow of consumption,
the shorter the time period is, the lower is velocity. In the limit as the time
9With ￿ = 0, increasing competition plays no role in the commitment case but there
would be monopoly pro￿ts with a single monopolist.
16period goes to zero, while the stock of money remains constant, the ￿ ow of
consumption converges to zero, and so does velocity. At zero velocity, even
a very small nominal interest rate would mean an arbitrarily large cost of
using money. As the length of the time period goes down, velocity also goes
down, in such a way that the future gains from money issuance are invariant
to that change.
5 Robustness
In the monetary model of currency competition that we have analyzed, in
any time period, there are two relevant elasticities of substitution. On the
one hand, the holder of currency will be considering alternative currencies
to hold in the future. The opportunity cost of holding each currency is
the future return on interest-bearing assets denominated in that currency.
The elasticity of substitution could be quite high, possibly arbitrarily large.
On the other hand, currency holders also hold outstanding money balances.
Those balances are whatever they are: they cannot be changed. On these
outstanding money balances, the elasticity is zero. For the currency issuer,
the elasticity of substitution that is relevant for current decisions is zero, while
the elasticity of substitution that is relevant for future decisions is positive;
it could even be in￿nite.10 With commitment, the issuer of currency will
always want to exploit the initial period zero elasticity, and in￿ ate away those
initial liabilities. Commitment, precisely, is the capacity to credibly restrain
from extracting these short-term rents. In addition, there would then be
competition in nominal interest rates. As it turns out, because money is
costless to produce competition will drive down the price of money to its
marginal cost regardless of the elasticity of substitution across currencies.
As seen in section 3, for a small cost of providing currencies, the outcome
would depend on the elasticity of future money holdings. In particular, if this
elasticity is arbitrarily large, then the equilibrium outcomes will be e¢ cient,
as the cost of production also converges to zero.
Instead, if the currency issuer is unable to commit to future decisions,
10In a related literature (see Phelps and Winter (1970), Diamond (1971), Bils (1989),
Nakamura and Steinsson (2009)) ￿rms face di⁄erent short-and long-run elasticities, pos-
sibly because of habits. In such a context, ￿rms￿decisions are also time inconsistent.
However, because the short-run elasticity is not zero, as it is in our case, the short-run
elasticity will matter for the characterization of equilibria without commitment.
17then competition in nominal interest rates is meaningless. The relevant elas-
ticity of substitution that it faces is zero, period after period. If reputational
considerations are not taken into account, then the issuer will always want
to act on the zero elasticity, and the only equilibrium is one where money
has no value. Beliefs about future actions, because future pro￿ts can be high
enough, may discipline the issuer of money, and there could be equilibria
where actual in￿ ation is not arbitrarily large. This mechanism is indepen-
dent of the elasticity of substitution for future holdings, and therefore in our
framework, it is independent of competition.
We make these points in a version of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monop-
olistic competition. It is clearly a very particular set-up.11 Now, is it the
case, that alternative models of competition would a⁄ect the results? How
general are the results?
In the case of commitment, if money were costly to produce, then the
particular model of competition would a⁄ect the results in all the usual ways.
If the number of ￿rms were ￿nite, it would matter whether competition
was Bertrand or Cournot, and the number of ￿rms would matter. If the
number of ￿rms were endogenous, and there was free entry, as in the Salop
(1979) circular-city model, this would also a⁄ect the commitment results. It
turns out that because money is costless to produce, currency competition
results, in our model, in an e¢ cient outcome even if currencies are not perfect
substitutes. This particular feature may not be true in alternative models
of competition. An example is the model of Taub (1985). Taub studies a
monetary model with Cournot competition across N currency issuers. He
considers two distinct regimes: one with full commitment, and another in
which there is partial commitment and polices are constrained to be Markov
perfect. He shows that in the commitment case, the Friedman rule emerges
as the equilibrium outcome only in the limiting case of perfect competition
(N ! 1).
Instead, without commitment, as it turns out, the results are quite gen-
eral. Whatever is the form of competition, the elasticity of the outstanding
money balances will always be zero, and the demands for future money hold-
ings will be a function of today￿ s actions according to arbitrary beliefs. That
is, beliefs about the future returns of the di⁄erent currencies fully determine
11Clearly this model does not capture all the features that currency competition en-
tails; for example, there are interesting issues regarding competing currencies as ￿ means
of exchange.￿
18the demands, not the underlying elasticities of substitution. We argue that
these are general features of currency competition without commitment.
Regardless of future elasticities, or strategic interactions, there will always
be an equilibrium where the issuers will take into account only the short-run
gains, resulting in beliefs that will not sustain valued money. This will be
the worst sustainable equilibrium. Alternative equilibrium outcomes will be
sustained by a possible reversion to the worst sustainable equilibrium. Any
deviation from an equilibrium outcome will trigger beliefs that the currency
issuer will be in￿ ating in the future. This will happen regardless of the
elasticity of substitution or other ￿rms￿reactions. With unrestricted beliefs,
this results in an indeterminacy of sustainable equilibria, where competition
plays no role.
It should be noticed that Taub (1985) obtains di⁄erent results. In partic-
ular, in his analysis with limited commitment competition plays a role. This
is driven by two di⁄erent assumptions. He assumes that there is at least one-
period commitment and he considers only Markov perfect equilibria. The
former implies that currency issuers can compete period by period, without
being able to take advantage of the zero elasticity on outstanding balances.
The latter means that beliefs are restricted to depend only on variables that
directly a⁄ect current and next period payo⁄s. We do not impose any of
these restrictions. In Taub (1985), in the case of partial commitment, in-
creasing the degree of competition results in an ine¢ cient outcome, implying
vanishing real money balances.
In any sustainable equilibrium, the issuers must make positive pro￿ts
out of currency issuance. In our model, the number of ￿rms is exogenous,
so this is not a problem in our set-up. However, in a model with many
potential entrant ￿rms ready to replace the incumbent ￿rms, shouldn￿ t there
be a zero pro￿t condition? There are equilibria with positive pro￿ts, because
consumers may believe that new entry will result in bad quality money and,
therefore, in a rational expectations equilibrium, these consumers￿beliefs
deter new ￿rms from entering.
The indeterminacy of Sustainable Currency Competition Equilibria is not
a special feature of our model, as long as beliefs are unrestricted. Restric-
tions on beliefs may reduce the set of SCCE. For example, if expectations
about future returns are functions of current and past prices (of ht) and,
as in learning models, there is more structure on how agents form their ex-
pectations, competition may play a role in restricting the set of sustainable
equilibria, since currency issuers will compete taking these forecasting func-
19tions as given. Decisions on current prices, Rq(i)t, will have a predictable
e⁄ect on expectations of future interest rates, ￿i
t(ht; 1
Rq(i)t+1), without being
constrained to a speci￿c interest rate, as in the beliefs supporting ￿ trigger
strategies￿ . As a result, there can be an intertemporal e⁄ect which may re-
store a role for competition and, possibly, drive in￿ ation rates to the zero
lower bound of Proposition 212. However, even if some of these restrictions
are reasonable, restricting beliefs opens up a di⁄erent set of issues that we
do not pursue here.
There is an extensive literature on models of reputation with adverse
selection (e.g. Tirole (1996), Cabral (2009), Levin (2009)); however, equilib-
rium selection arguments based on discrimination in adverse selection models
do not apply to our currency competition model, where there are no repu-
tational state variables about ￿ types￿￿say, ￿ good￿or ￿ bad￿currency issuers.
All currency issuers face the same incentive problems and there is no room
for discrimination among ￿ types￿ .
Finally, it should also be noticed that while we have only characterized
stationary Sustainable Currency Competition Equilibria, our results gener-
alize to non-stationary SCCE. The worst SCCE of Proposition 1 is an equi-
librium that sustains non-stationary Currency Competition Equilibria. Fur-
thermore, for a given path of interest rates to be sustainable as a currency
competition equilibrium it is enough that, in every period and for every
currency issuer, the expected future gains are higher than the value of the
current currency holdings.
6 Money is an experience good
The private provision of currencies is by no means the only case where pro-
ducers compete for promises and the standard ￿ Bertrand competition￿argu-
ment does not apply. Competition in experience goods - those whose quality
can only be revealed by consuming the good - has similar properties, since
￿rms have an incentive to ￿ ￿ y-by-night￿and provide low quality products.
￿ Bertrand competition￿can only a⁄ect market prices, but not qualities which
12For example, if agents￿forecasting rules are such that trust is monotone with respect















taking this into account, will compete.
20are observed only ex-post13.
To be more speci￿c, suppose that, instead of being monopolistic compet-
itive issuers of currency, ￿rms supplied ￿nal goods also under monopolistic
competition. Assume producers have, at any time, the option of produc-
ing either high quality goods ￿at some unitary cost ￿or ￿ fake￿units of the
consumption good that are costless to produce and deliver no utility to the
buyer. A key assumption for the characterization of the equilibria is whether
consumers can distinguish the high quality goods from the low quality ones
before they buy them.
If the quality of the goods is perfectly observable before buying, the equi-
librium is uniquely determined: The price chosen by each monopolist is deter-
mined by the elasticity of substitution. As goods become closer substitutes,
the equilibrium outcome becomes more e¢ cient. It is Pareto e¢ cient in the
limiting case of perfect substitution. In sum, the ￿ Bertrand competition￿
argument holds.
Imagine, instead, that the quality is only observed with a lag. In a dy-
namic economy, ￿rms are concerned for their future market position and this
may be enough to discipline them to e⁄ectively provide high quality goods.
Given that the ￿rm has the option of making a short-run pro￿t by selling low
quality goods, the equilibrium mark-up must be high enough for the ￿rm to
choose not to follow this path. The equilibrium mark-up is not determined by
the elasticity of substitution, as in the case of perfect observability. Rather,
it is determined by the need to guarantee enough future pro￿ts to ensure
high quality. Increasing the degree of substitutability does not a⁄ect the set
of equilibria, and competition plays no role.
Thus, while the provision of money and the provision of experience goods
seem a priori very di⁄erent problems, the former being a ￿ time inconsistency
problem￿and the latter a ￿ moral hazard problem￿the ways in which compe-
tition and trust interact are strikingly similar. In both models ￿rms compete
on prices that are not observable or that they cannot commit to: in the
quality-goods model, this is the price of the good per unit of quality; in the
currency competition model it is the nominal interest rate, or the in￿ ation
rate. With perfect observability in the ￿rst model and with full commitment
in the second, there is no distinction between set and realized prices. With
13Shapiro (1983) considers a model of monopolistic competition with experience goods.
However, in his model consumers￿expectations regarding quality follow an ad-hoc exoge-
nous process. He does not study the trade-o⁄s between competition and reputation.
21unobservable quality in the ￿rst model and lack of commitment in the second,
we have to consider o⁄-equilibrium paths where the ex-post realized prices
may di⁄er from the ex-ante prices. In such cases, ￿rms maximize short-run
pro￿ts by setting an arbitrarily large realized price, which in the experience
good model corresponds to choosing low quality and in the currency model
corresponds to in￿ ating away current money holdings (i.e. in making ￿ the
quality of outstanding money￿arbitrarily low). In both models, the timing is
very important: Consumers purchase services before they observe the qual-
ity they yield in one, and they purchase currencies before they observe the
real return they yield in the other; in both models consumers must form
their expectations of realized prices on the basis of past information and cur-
rent prices, and in both models reputation is what may prevent ￿rms from
￿ ￿ ying-by-night.￿ .
There is, however, a di⁄erence in how short-run pro￿ts are made. In the
standard experience good model they are made on the current production
￿ ow, while in the currency model they are made on the current money stock.
This has implications. For example, shortening the period reduces the short-
run gain in the case of experience goods but not in the case of currencies,
while in neither case does it a⁄ect the present value of the future ￿ ow of
pro￿ts. Therefore, shortening the time period makes it easier to sustain
high quality in the experience good model but not in the currency model.
Nevertheless, in both models reducing the rate of time preference for a ￿xed
period length makes it possible to sustain more e¢ cient outcomes: in the
experience goods model by virtue of the standard ￿ Folk-Theorem￿argument;
in the currency model because a lower real interest rate reduces the value of
depleting the current stock of money.
Finally, there are two more relevant di⁄erences between currencies and
experience goods. One is that it is meaningless to consider costless experience
goods. Another, making the ￿ time-inconsistency￿currency problem more
di¢ cult to circumvent, is that with experience goods ￿rms can implement
a policy of replacing bad quality goods, a policy which is not available to a
currency provider.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have addressed an old question in monetary theory: can
currency be e¢ ciently provided by competitive markets? We ￿rst show a
22￿ aw in the standard ￿ Bertrand competition￿argument when suppliers com-
pete on promises rather than on tangible deliveries. The key issue is whether
promises can be ￿ automatically trusted￿ , and expectations based on them
always ful￿lled. In the provision of currencies promised returns ful￿ll con-
sumers￿expectations when currency suppliers are fully committed to their
promises. In this context, trust is automatically achieved and the competi-
tion mechanism results in an e¢ cient allocation.
However, expectations based on promises may not be automatically ful-
￿lled, because suppliers may not be able to commit to maintain future prices
to achieve the promised returns. In this context, it must be in the interest of
suppliers to be trustworthy: future rewards must compensate the temptation
to renege on their promises. The need for such future rewards determines a
lower bound on the degree of e¢ ciency that can be achieved in these mar-
kets. In the market for the provision of money, the lower bound requires
non-negative in￿ ation and, therefore, positive nominal interest rates, away
from the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates. A ￿rst corollary of this
result is that Hayek￿ s conjecture, that e¢ cient monetary equilibria can be
achieved through currency competition, is not veri￿ed if currency suppliers
make sequential decisions.
There is a second, somewhat disturbing, corollary to the previous result.
Once the ￿ trust mechanism￿works it fully determines which equilibrium is
achieved and, since beliefs sustaining trust are fairly arbitrary, there is an
indeterminacy of such equilibria. That is, any positive in￿ ation can be part
of a stationary equilibrium outcome.
In summary, competition and trust are two disciplinary mechanisms that
can enhance e¢ ciency and one would think that they should be mutually
reinforcing. We have seen that this may not be the case in a model of currency
competition. With commitment, competition plays a role, but not trust (it
is automatically satis￿ed); without commitment, trust plays a role, but not
competition. In the former case, currency competition guarantees e¢ ciency ￿
independently of substitutability because currencies are costless to produce.
In the latter, the trust mechanism sets a lower bound on in￿ ation and the
e¢ cient outcome cannot be achieved. Competition and trust in currency
markets is an old question; competition and the need for trust in ￿nancial
markets is a timely one.
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